Naming the War

George Friedman
Chairman, Strategic Forecasting

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The commission made two critical points. First, it asserted there was a war going on. There has been some doubt about this: Some have begun to argue that the Sept. 11 attacks were an isolated incident and that Americans should "get over it." Others have argued that it was primarily a criminal conspiracy and that the legal system should handle it. The commission made the unequivocal argument that it was a war and should be treated as such.

Wars are against enemies, and the commission makes the case that terrorism is not, by itself, a meaningful enemy. Rather, the enemy is -- according to the commission -- al Qaeda, and along with al Qaeda, radical Islam as an ideology. That means that, from the commission's viewpoint, this is a war between the United States and al Qaeda or, alternatively, a war between the United States and radical Islam. Given the gingerly way in which Americans have approached the question of the nature of the enemy, it is striking that the commission honed in on what has been one of the few aspects of delicacy in the Bush administration's approach to war -- completely rejecting the administration's attempt to subsume the war under the general rubric of terrorism.

Terrorism is a military strategy: It is an attempt to defeat an enemy by striking directly against its general population and thereby creating a sense of terror which, it is hoped, will lead the population to move against the government and force it to some sort of political acquiescence or accommodation. During World War II, for example, one of the primary uses of air power was to create terror among the population. The German bombardment of London, British nighttime area bombardment of German cities, American firebombing and atomic bombing of Japanese cities -- all were terror attacks. They were explicitly designed to put the population at risk, in efforts to prompt the enemy's capitulation. It did not work at all against the British; there is debate over what role, if any, it played against the Germans; and it certainly had a massive, if not decisive, effect in the case of the Japanese.

Terror, of course, was not confined to World War II. It has been a frequent feature of warfare.

Many countries have used terror attacks. So have individuals and non-state groups. Timothy McVeigh's attack against the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was intended to generate some sort of political change. The attacks by the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany during the 1970s or the bombings of the Weather Underground in the United States were similarly intended to generate political change. That McVeigh, Ulriche Meinhoff and Mark Rudd had not the slightest idea of what they were trying to achieve nor of the relationship between their attacks and their strategy -- such as it was -- speaks to their own serious limitations. It says nothing about the potential uses of terror attacks in warfare, nor to the fact that terror attacks can be effective, given a clear strategy, planning and execution. Governments can be forced to change strategy when their populations are placed at risk.

This is the conceptual problem with terrorism: Like any sort of warfare, it can be successful or not, depending on circumstances. However, terrorism in some form or another is among the most accessible types of warfare. What we mean by this is that while it is difficult for a handful of ideologues to secure a navy and impose a blockade, it is not impossible for a handful of people to carry out some limited attacks against a population, if it is no greater than firing a bullet into someone's kneecap or hijacking a plane. Terrorism provides a unique opportunity for small, non-state groups to wage war.

Historically, most of these non-state groups have consisted either of mental or emotional defectives or of individuals whose cause was so hopeless the act of terrorism could at best be considered a form of bloody theater rather than as a serious threat. It is extremely difficult to take the Basque separatist group ETA seriously in the sense of expecting that their attacks against the population will lead to a desired political evolution. It was certainly impossible to imagine how Rudd, Meinhoff or McVeigh possibly could have thought any strategic goal could have been reached through the use of terror attacks.

The general use of terror attacks by non-state actors has involved people like this. The concept of terrorism, as it developed since the 1960s, has focused not on terror as a potentially viable military strategy, but as an inherently non-state activity. This is a serious historical error. But a more serious error followed from this: If terrorism is something non-state actors use, and non-state actors tend in general to be imbeciles, posturers or lost causes looking for attention, then terrorism is no longer a serious military tool in the hands of strategists. It is, instead, a form of social and personal dysfunction, and therefore need not be taken seriously.

It was the secular Palestinian movement after 1967 that adopted the use of isolated counterpopulation attacks most effectively. Apart from attacks against Israel and Israelis, where no significant political shift was expected, terrorism was directed against allies of Israel, such as the United States. The strategy there -- not unlike the strategy in Iraq today -- was to impose costs for Israeli allies that would surpass the benefits of alliance. In this case, terror attacks had a definite goal -- to change the relationship between Israel and its allies. But the movement was hurt in several ways. First, the Israelis struck back. Second, many Arab countries, including Jordan and Saudi Arabia, worked actively against the Palestinian radicals. Finally, the Palestinians were engaged in an ongoing struggle in which the terrorist attacks became more focused on defining the relations among competing Palestinian factions than on any strategic political goal.

Terrorism, therefore, seemed to be a tool in the hands of the strategically helpless. Some began and ended in hopeless confusion, succeeding in shedding blood for no purpose. However, the Palestinians who took terrorism as a tactic to the global stage themselves lost their strategic bearings by the 1980s, when it was no longer clear what they were trying to accomplish with some of their operations. Terrorism ceased to be regarded as a military option for nation-states, and it never was quite taken seriously as an effective strategic option for non-state actors. It became a form of moral derangement in the hands of the hopelessly confused and the strategically handicapped. It became a tool of losers.

Al Qaeda uses terrorism. This group pursues counterpopulation operations designed to generate political evolutions that benefit its goals. By calling the war against al Qaeda a war on terrorism, the Bush administration committed two massive mistakes.

First, it lumped al Qaeda in with Mark Rudd and ETA. The latter two are not serious; the former is very serious. Both use the same tactics, but one has a strategic mission. In using this label, it became much more difficult for the administration itself to take al Qaeda seriously. How can you take something seriously that is part of such a collection of dunderheads? The Bush administration underestimated its enemy -- always dangerous in war.

Second, it confused the question of who the enemy was. If the war is against terrorism, then everyone who uses terrorism is the enemy. That's a lot of groups -- including on occasion, the United States. If one is waging a war against terrorism, one is at war against a tactic, not a personifiable enemy. Alternatively, the war must be waged against hundreds or thousands of enemy groups. The concept of terrorism is a wonderful way to get lost.

The most important problem is that if al Qaeda is simply part of a broader spectrum of groups using terror operations, then the unique strategic interests of al Qaeda disappear. Al Qaeda has clear strategic goals: It wants to foment a rising in the Islamic world that will topple one or more governments, and replace them with regimes around which the reborn caliphate can be based. The Sept. 11 attacks were designed to trigger that rising. That has not happened, but al Qaeda is still there.

By ignoring the strategic goals of the attacks -- and this is critically important -- the Bush administration lost its ability to measure success in the war. The issue is not merely whether al Qaeda has lost the ability to carry out terrorist attacks; the more important question is whether al Qaeda has achieved its strategic goals through the use of terrorist attacks. The answer to that is an emphatic no. Al Qaeda not only has not come close to achieving its goal, but has actually moved to a weaker position since 9/11 -- having lost its Afghan base and having had Saudi Arabia turn against it. By focusing on the tactic -- terrorism -- rather than on the strategy, the Bush administration has actually managed to confuse the issue so much that its own successes are invisible. The terror tactics remain, but al Qaeda's strategic goal is as far away as ever.

The administration has confused not only the situation but itself at all levels by focusing on terrorism in general. It not only lost its ability to measure strategic progress in the war, but also failed to understand the unique characteristics of al Qaeda. In fairness, this has been a failure going back to the Clinton administration, but the hangover remains. The term "terrorism" reminds everyone of hippies running wild and Palestinians attacking Olympic Games. It loses the particular significance of al Qaeda -- its unique intellectual and strategic coherence. It makes al Qaeda appear dumber than it is and causes miscalculation on the part of the United States.

It is interesting to remember why the Bush administration chose the name for the war that it did. Part of it had to do, of course, with the tendency of terrorism experts to treat al Qaeda as part of their domain. But the more important part had to do with not wanting to think in terms of a war against Islam -- radical or otherwise. From the beginning, the administration has not wanted to emphasize the connection between al Qaeda and Islam. Rather, it has tried to treat al Qaeda as an Islamic aberration. It was easier to do so by linking it with terrorism in some generic sense than by linking it with Islam.

The administration needed Islamic countries to participate in its coalition. It did not want to appear in any way to be at war with any brand or style of Islam. In fighting al Qaeda, it was much easier to be at war with terrorism than with Islam. Stated differently, the administration was afraid that it would lose control of the war's definition if it focused on al Qaeda's Islamic links rather than on its terrorist tactics. It did not want pogroms against Muslims in the United States, and it sought to manage it relations with Islamic states very carefully.

The selection of the term "war on terror" was, therefore, not accidental. It has been merely very confusing. It is this very confusion that the 9/11 Commission has pointed out. You cannot be at war with a type of military operation; you have to be at war with a military actor -- and in this case, the actor has been an organization that is part of a broader element of radical Islam -- which is, in turn, fighting for dominance in the Islamic world in general. That makes it a more important war, a more dangerous war and a much more complex one than merely a war against terrorism.

This essay was originally published on 3 August 2004 for paid subscribers to Strategic Forecasting. It is reprinted here with the special permission of Strategic Forecasting. A brief biography of Dr. Friedman can be found at our main Commentary page. Further information regarding the services offered by Strategic Forecasting can be found at their web site. Other web sites are welcome to link to this essay, with proper credit given to Future Brief and Dr. Friedman. This page will remain posted on the Internet indefinitely at this web address to provide a stable page for those linking to it.

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Share Your Comments (read our submission policy)  I think that the author has made excessive use of iteration to make and remake his points, which could have been expressed in one to two paragraphs. That said, the points he makes are important ones: that the war is really a war against radical Islam, and against a specific actor (Al Qaeda) as a member of radical Islam, and that it is dangerous to underestimate an enemy motivated by clear strategic goals, which have implications in Islamic countries that far more reaching than the erradication of a terrorist organization. Posted By : BillMacPherson  on  Monday, August 09, 2004, 4:44:29 PM The last three paragraphs of the essay exonerate Bush in that they point to rational reasons for his choice of a title for the war. Would the author have him specifically designate al Qaeda as the enemy? Most appear to come out of the Islamic world, but not all are religiously motivated. In the cold war days, most terrorists appeared to be some kind of socialists or radical leftists. Some of these are probably still existent. There are many potential terrorists in the USA. I have heard people say that McVeigh only picked the wrong target. One matter is clear. The difficulty governments have in dealing with terror makes it attractive to more and more disgruntled people with a diversity of purpose. The best chance states have to counter Posted By : Brian Saint-Yves  on  Monday, August 09, 2004, 5:31:28 PM The author makes some very valid point in a, mostly, reasoned argument. There is, however, one serious error, namely, calling ETA - the Basque Nationalist terrorist organization that operates in Spain - 'not serious." In fact, since the 1970s, ETA has killed over 800 Spaniards in a very systematic attempt to make the cost of keeping the Basque provinces more than granting the area independence from Spain. They have used political assassination, car bombs, and other types of bombing to instill a very real and SERIOUS fear into Spain's population. While not as global in their interests as Al Qaeda, labeling them as not serious is a very serious underestimation of their determination as an enemy of the state. Ironic, given that the author has decried the Bush administration's underestimation of Al Qaeda in the article. Posted By : DavidOrtizJr  on  Friday, August 13, 2004, 2:40:00 PM A few comments. First is the use of the revealed word "counterpopulation", which isn't in the Oxford Dictionary. Why not use the word "terrorist?" Why downplay the violence?Unlike the author, who when picturing terrorism see "hippies running wild and Palestinians attacking the Olympics", most Americans vividly see the collapse of the Twin Towers or a burning Pentagon. The average American understands what the War on Terros is. Our enemies understand as well, they've been on the run for over 3 years. The author states the Bush administration has lost its ability to measure success in the war. The rest of the paragraph, however, contradicts this assertion by noting al Qaeda has become weaker, Afghanistan is no longer a terrorist base, and that Saudi Arabia has awakened to the threat. Although far from comprehensive, this short list of U.S. successes are hardly "invisible." Posted By : DickSkelton  on  Friday, September 17, 2004, 4:15:44 PM Mere semantics, I'm afraid ... interesting, but too narrow. Radical Islam, can be seen all over Iran, Pakistan Madras', Saudi Wahabism and a myriad of similar movements. They grow and prosper because they are either useful instruments to divert the population from unrealistic (material) expectations, or because they impose a social discipline that the broader culture otherwise lacks. Acting militarily against them merely encourages them (or, at least, makes them more stubborn). Still, to win this "war" we do have to take military action, but we have to win the hearts and minds as well -- but our "hearts and minds" are firmly entrenched in western cultural values. Hence the problem. Don't know all the answers, but let's try and get the questions right, eh? Posted By : MarkNewdick  on  Wednesday, September 29, 2004, 7:54:57 AM There's a difference between Hiroshima and 9/11 which does not justify lumping them together as instances of the same thing. 9/11 was an act of unprovoked agression, intended to be a prelude to bigger and better things. Hiroshima was an instance of collateral civilian casualities occurring when a country that had been attacked decided to do the only thing available to it that would cause an immediate termination of hostilities, involving sacrificing a number of enemy civilians which would be much smaller than the number of those civilians likely to have become casualities in a prolonged conventional invasion. Posted By : Richard Brodie  on  Friday, November 26, 2004, 10:34:31 PM How does a war against Al Qaeda deal with the factor of nuclear weapons? We have Israel to thank for the absence of such a threat in Iraq, but where do we turn now? Iran is certainly on its way to having nuclear weapons which makes our threat of attack against them somewhat bold and foolish. As I see it, Iran's government is, in so many ways, what Al Qaeda is striving for in the region. If Iran should decide to join forces with Al Qaeda, that will make our enemy almost as formidable as we are. Terrorists armed with nuclear weapons may mean we are at a stalemate, not unlike our war with the Soviets except they didn't hate us more than they loved life. Can Stratfor provide strategies? Posted By : BarbaraLeBey  on  Saturday, January 01, 2005, 1:56:58 PM Comment by Richard R. Tryon 1.The Bush Administration gave us the name ‘War on Terror ‘ for several reason. It is bigger than War on Al Quaida or War on Islamist Extremists for several reasons:. it is dealing with a time in history when terror is not just what Israelis have seen with suicidal people wearing bombs;or the use of massed armies on horseback as seen in history; but rather with the chance for an organized and funded group like Al Quaida to obtain WMD and use them and leave survivors not knowing how to defend or where to strike back. 2. The book by George Friedman was released on Oct 4, 2004 just ahead of the election. Its timing is suspect as it points out military and intelligence failures common t Posted By : Richard R. Tryon  on  Friday, March 25, 2005, 9:47:50 PM Remember the "War on Poverty" and "War on Drugs", war's on things don't work. Poverty, drugs, and terrorism will all be around long after Al-Qaeda has been vanquished. The author is correct, terrorism is a strategy not an enemy. War's typically name a place, time, or country involved. (War of 1812, Spanish-American War, Vietnam War, etc.) I'm not sure what the correct name is but I know it's not "War on Terrorism". Maybe the "9-11 War" or "Al-Qaeda War". Posted By : KevinAyers  on  Saturday, May 28, 2005, 1:19:15 PM Click Here To Post Your Comments